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Abstract
The Ontario Court of Appeal recently released a decision rejecting a constitutional
challenge to the Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
Regulations. In this paper I argue that the Court’s reasoning in Doe v Canada is flawed
and that certain provisions of the Semen Regulations constitute an unjustified
infringement of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I also argue
that the claimants in this case would have been better served by the jurisprudence of
section 15 of the Charter had they premised their argument on the assertion that they
were discriminated against on the basis of family status rather than sexual orientation.
Such an approach would be preferable both in terms of avoiding the pitfalls of the formal
equality approach to section 15 adopted by both levels of court in this case, in addition to
providing a more inclusive and progressive litigation strategy for acquiring legal
recognition of familial relationships which deviate from the hetero-normative paradigm
assumed by the Semen Regulations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
As the legal regulation of reproductive technologies in Canada has increased, so

too have the legal (and with them financial) obstacles to parenthood such regulation
presents to individuals, couples and families whose methods of reproduction are in some
respect outside the norm. The Ontario Court of Appeal recently released a decision
rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Processing and Distribution of Semen for
Assisted Conception Regulations.1 This paper will argue that the Ontario Court of
Appeal erred in adopting the reasoning of the lower court in Doe v Canada,2 and that
certain provisions of the Semen Regulations constitute an unjustified infringement of
section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 It will further argue that
the claimants in this case would have been better served by the jurisprudence of section
15 of the Charter had they premised their argument on the assertion that they were
discriminated against on the basis of family status rather than sexual orientation. Such an
approach would be preferable both in terms of avoiding the pitfalls of the formal equality
approach to section 15 adopted by both levels of court in this case, in addition to
providing a more inclusive and progressive litigation strategy for acquiring legal
recognition of familial relationships which deviate from the hetero-normative paradigm
assumed by the Semen Regulations.
My discussion will be divided into three parts. In the first part I will provide a
brief historical background and overview of the Semen Regulations followed by a
1

S.O.R./96-254 [hereinafter the “Semen Regulations” or alternatively the “Regulations”].
Susan Doe v. Canada (Attorney General), 79 O.R. (3d) 586 aff’d 276 D.L.R. (4th) 127 (C.A.) [hereinafter
“Doe v Canada”]. The constitutional validity of the Semen Regulations was originally challenged in an
earlier case Jane Doe v Canada (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 191 which was dismissed after the
claimant successfully conceived through home insemination.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11
[hereinafter the “Charter”].
2
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discussion of the reasoning in the Doe v Canada decision. Included in this section will
be an observation of the difficulties, as well demonstrated in the Doe v Canada decision,
with the jurisprudential trend towards privileging legislative objective over ensuring
equal protection from inequitable legal effect,4 under section 15 analysis. In the second
section of the paper I will suggest that a better strategy for the claimants in Doe v Canada
would have been to argue that the Semen Regulations violate the equality guarantees
under section 15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of family status. The third
section of the paper will suggest that while the critique advanced by some scholars
suggesting that equality jurisprudence has essentialized gay and lesbian identity and
failed to adequately subvert oppressive heterosexual norms is not without some merit,5
we ought not overlook the manner in which the legal successes of the gay and lesbian
rights movement may have laid the groundwork or set the stage for the types of social
progress and transformations understandably embraced by these critics. This section will
conclude with the observation that while the categorical approach to equality
jurisprudence in Canada (and its potentially essentializing and homogenizing tendencies)
may be here to stay (at least for now), queer activists, litigants and academics ought not
to conclude that progressive advancement cannot be achieved under section 15 of the
Charter. Instead, we ought to set about queering the categories of prohibited
discrimination enumerated or analogized under section 15. I will conclude my discussion
by suggesting that the Doe v Canada case offers yet another opportunity to critically rethink what family means in Canadian society.
4

See for example Dianne Pothier, “Equality as a Comparative Concept: Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall,
What’s the Fairest of Them All?” in Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms eds Sheila McIntyre & Sandra Rogers (Butterworths: Canada, 2006) 135.
5
See for example Brenda Cossman, “Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” discussed below, infra note 55.
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II.

SUSAN DOE v CANADA AND THE SEMEN REGULATIONS

The Semen Regulations were enacted in 1996 under the Food and Drug Act6. The
impetus for the Regulations arose as a result of a concern expressed in the Report of the
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies in 1993 over the lack of uniform
national standards applicable to the several sperm banks (now called semen
establishments) across Canada responsible for the screening and collection of semen from
anonymous donors.7 The concern was that women who utilized semen from anonymous
donors who had deposited at sperm banks that did not screen for diseases were at risk of
contracting some form of communicable disease. The source of the Royal Commission’s
concern with the risk of infection from donor insemination was the use of semen from
anonymous donors, not the use of semen from known donors. In fact it is unlikely that
the Commission focused on known donors at all, given that the Report doesn’t actually
distinguish between known and anonymous donors.
The Regulations prohibit the clinical use of semen in “assisted conception” unless and
until the following has occurred: the donor has tested negative for a number of
communicable diseases including HIV and Hepatitis B and C, the semen has been cryopreserved (frozen) and quarantined for six months and, the donor has then re-tested
negative for these diseases. The inequality created by the Semen Regulations relates
primarily to their application to known donors rather than to restrictions and prohibitions

6

R.S.C. 1985, c. F.27, s.31.
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Political and
Social Affairs Division, 1993) Part 2, s. b.
7
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on the use of anonymous semen donation in assisted conception practices.8 The
inequality stems from the Regulations’ definition of “assisted conception”.
The Semen Regulations define “assisted conception” as a “reproductive technique
performed on a woman for the purpose of conception using semen from a donor who is
not her spouse or sexual partner”.9 In other words, women who are married to, living
together in common-law relationships with, or having sex with their chosen donor, can
access assisted conception procedures without being subject to the Regulations’
restrictions; they can be inseminated by their physicians without their donor first
undergoing the screening, and without being subjected to the wait period and the costs
(both pecuniary and otherwise) imposed as a result of the Semen Regulations. Women
who are not in a spousal or sexual relationship with their chosen donor do not have this
option. Individuals who are not in a spousal or sexual relationship with their chosen
donor, regardless of their relationship to the donor, will, in order to receive assisted
conception services, first have to incur the cost of having the semen screened,
cryopreserved for six months and then re-screened10 – a cost which is measured in the
thousands. In the end, they will only have access to cryo-preserved semen rather than
fresh semen. The rate of successful assisted conception using frozen sperm is, however,
significantly lower than the rate of success when assisted conception is conducted with
fresh sperm.11

8

The potential section 15 challenge to the Semen Regulations on the basis that they outright prohibit all
anonymous semen donations from gay men should be noted but will not be addressed in this paper. This
prohibition raises issues similar to those being litigated in relation to the Red Cross’ outright prohibition
against all gay male blood donors.
9
Supra note 1 at s. 1.
10
Supra note 1 at s.4, 9-11.
11
This was a finding of fact recognized by the Court in Doe v Canada, supra note 2 at para. 51.
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The Regulations impose an additional barrier to accessing assisted conception
procedures for those women who are not in a sexual or spousal relationship with their
known donor and whose known donor is gay or over 40. Prior to 2002, under the
Regulations the use of semen in assisted conception from men belonging to one of a
number of particular categories was not permitted under any circumstances. The
excluded categories include men over the age of forty, alcoholics, and men who have had
sex with another man, even once, since 1977.12 In 2002 the government amended the
Regulations to provide for what is described in the Regulations as Special Access
Authorization.13 Under the new provisions a physician can now, with special government
authorization, use the semen of a gay man to perform assisted conception procedures. To
acquire that authorization a physician is required to provide the government with, among
other things, a rationale outlining “the reasons that justify the use of the requested semen”
and the “reasons why the needs of the patient cannot be met using semen” from a man
who hasn’t had sex with another man, even once, since 1977.14 This requirement for
special authorization to use the semen of a man from the excluded category of donors is
required after the known donor and his semen have undergone the testing regiment
required by the Regulations and been deemed safe. In other words, individuals whose
known donor is a gay man (as often seems to be the case for lesbian couples15) will, even

12

Semen Regulations, supra note 1 at s. 1 (adopting the Health Canada Directive entitled Technical
Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination. The exclusions are enumerated at section 2.1 of the
Directive.)
13
Semen Regulations, supra note 1 at s.19(2)(m)(i) and (ii).
14
Ibid.
15
And then...the Brides Changed Nappies: Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fathers and the Legal Recognition of Our
Relationships with the Children We Raise, A Community Law Reform Project, prepared by Jenni Millbank
and the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby Inc. (NSW), Final Report, April 2003 at 5 (available at:
www.glrl.org.au) [hereinafter “The Brides Changed Nappies”]; see also Fiona Kelly, “Nuclear Norms or
Fluid Families? Incorporating Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children into Canadian Family Law” 21
Can. J. Fam. L. (2004) 133 at 138.
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after their chosen donor has twice been tested and cleared, still need their physician to
apply to the government for a Special Access Authorization.16
Doe v Canada involved a challenge to the Semen Regulations by ‘Susan Doe’ a
woman who sought assisted conception to conceive using semen from the same gay man
who had biologically fathered the claimant and her partner’s first child. The claimant’s
partner conceived and gave birth to the family’s first child and the couple wanted their
second child to be biologically related to their first child; in other words they wanted the
child to be biologically fathered by the same man who had biologically fathered their first
child. However, because Susan Doe was not in a sexual or spousal relationship with him,
her donor and his semen were subject to the Regulations. In addition, because he was a
gay man over the age of 40 it could only be used if Susan Doe’s physician received
Special Access Authorization from the federal government.17 While her donor was
willing to provide fresh semen for use in assisted conception he was not willing to have
his semen cyro-preserved and quarantined. As a result, Susan Doe was denied access to
assisted conception procedures using her chosen donor’s semen.
As a result, Susan Doe challenged the constitutional validity of the definition of
“assisted conception” under the Regulations, arguing that it violated section 15 of the
Charter by discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.18 The Ontario Superior
Court of Justice held that the definition of “assisted conception” in the Semen

16

Semen Regulations, supra note 1 at s.19(2)(m)(i) and (ii).
Ibid.
18
The claimant also unsuccessfully challenged the Semen Regulations under section 7 of the Charter. It is
Justice Dambrot’s section 15 analysis with which this paper is most concerned. Doe v Canada, supra note
1. Notably, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act declares, as one of its declaratory principles that
“persons who seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against,
including on the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status”. S.C. 2004, c.2, s.2(e)
17
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Regulations did not violate the claimant’s rights under section 15 of the Charter and this
decision was upheld on appeal.
Susan Doe argued that this exemption from the Regulations for the semen of a
woman’s spouse or sexual intimate discriminates against lesbians who by definition will
not have a semen donor who is a spouse or sexual partner. Justice Dambrot, of the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and Justice Macpherson of the Ontario Court of
Appeal (who on the whole adopted Justice Dambrot’s reasoning) disagreed.19 Justice
Dambrot found that the exemption from the Regulations was not, as Susan Doe had
argued, a recognition that “women are entitled to knowingly and voluntarily accept the
risks to themselves and to their unborn children associated with conceiving a child with
the donor of their choice.”20 His rejection of this claim was premised on the fact that
heterosexual women who are not in a sexual or spousal relationship with their donor are
also subject to the Regulations. As such he reasoned,
…simple logic tells me that the justification for the exemption of spouses
and sexual partners cannot be recognition that women are entitled to
knowingly and voluntarily accept the risks to themselves and to their
unborn children. It would be impossible to reconcile that purpose with the
fact that a heterosexual woman who wants to be inseminated by a known
donor is not exempt from the scheme…In other words a heterosexual
woman who wants to be inseminated by a known donor is denied the right
to knowingly and voluntarily accept the risks to themselves and to their

19
20

Doe v Canada, supra note 2.
Ibid. at para. 79-80.
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unborn child associated with conceiving a child with the donor of their
choice.21
Instead he suggests, “it makes perfect sense to exclude from the scheme women seeking
assisted conception with the semen of their spouses or sexual partners, because there is
no point in imposing the Semen Regulations on such women having regard to the fact
that they have already been exposed to any risk that exists, and will likely continue to be
exposed.”22 As such, for Justice Dambrot the logical distinction to be drawn is between
donors who are sexually intimate with, or married to, the women seeking assisted
conception and donors who are not. This health based rationale for the exemption
assumes that the risk of acquiring infectious diseases is the same whether or not the donor
is known to the recipient or anonymous. “It also makes perfect sense not to exclude any
other donors, but rather to insist on the same safeguards for all of them, whether they are
known to the woman or not.”23
Having identified this as the purpose of the exclusion, Justice Dambrot
unsurprisingly came to the conclusion that while concededly “lesbians do not ordinarily
have spouses or sexual partners who can donate semen” and therefore the Regulations do
impose differential treatment on them, sexual orientation is not the basis for this
differential treatment.
There are two difficulties with Justice Dambrot’s reasoning. Firstly, it adopts an
Aristotelian conception of equality which our courts have purportedly rejected in favour

21

Ibid. at para. 82.
Doe v Canada, supra note 2 at 83.
23
Ibid.

22
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of a more substantive approach to equality.24 While conceding that the definition of
assisted conception does, in its effect, subject lesbian women to differential treatment
based on sexual orientation, the Court employed a formal notion of equality, one that
privileges legislative objective over legislative effect, in order to determine that sexual
orientation was not the basis for the differential treatment. The difficulty with Justice
Dambrot’s decision is that he conflates a section 15 analysis with selective elements of a
section 1 analysis which as a result fails to take into account the salient difference
between lesbians and heterosexual women in this context. Unsurprisingly, and as the
Royal Commission on Reproductive Technologies noted in their report25, and Justice
Dambrot acknowledged in Doe v Canada26, a disproportionate number of Canadian
women without access to semen from their sexual partners happen to be lesbian. In fact,
the majority of individuals seeking assisted insemination with the semen of a known
donor with whom they are not sexually intimate are same sex oriented women.27 By
undertaking a section 15 analysis heavily reliant on legislative objective to identify the
appropriate comparator group, and to determine whether the differential treatment
experienced by lesbians under the Semen Regulations is based on their sexual orientation,
Justice Dambrot’s decision results in a formal concept of equality which denies the
claimant the substantive type of equality that the Supreme Court of Canada committed

24

See Law Society of British Columbia v Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 164 [hereinafter Andrews]. For
an excellent discussion on this point see Pothier, upra note 4 at 135, citing Andrews, in which the Supreme
Court stated that “identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality,”24 she notes that “[i]n
rejecting a “similarly situate” test as “deficient”, the Supreme Court of Canada began its section 15
interpretation by embracing substantive equality.”
25
Supra note 8.
26
Supra note 2.
27
See C. Wendland, F. Burn & C. Hill, “Donor Insemination: a comparison of lesbian couples,
heterosexual couples and single woman” (1996) 65(4) Fertil Steril 764; see also P. Baetans & A. Brewaeys,
“Lesbian Couples Requesting Donor Insemination: An Update of the knowledge with regard to lesbian
mother families” (2001) 7(5) Human Reproduction Update 512 at 514.
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itself to in the nascent days of its section 15 jurisprudence. Justice Dambrot’s reasoning
is a direct invocation of the similarly situated test. It is true that heterosexual women
without access to semen from their sexual partner who seek assisted conception with the
use of chosen donor semen are in the same legal situation under the Semen Regulations as
lesbian women; it is equally true that in British Columbia before 1997 it wasn’t only deaf
patients who didn’t receive a sign language interpreter upon admission to hospital.28
The second difficulty with the reasoning in Doe v Canada is that, despite how
obvious, simple and logical it seems to Justice Dambrot, it actually does not reflect reality
logic or reality to suggest that a woman using a non-spousal known donor would be
unlikely or less likely to take suitable precautions, such as STD testing, for her designated
donor. Indeed women in such circumstances may very well be more likely to insist that
their chosen donors be tested than are women who are in an intimate spousal or sexual
relationship with their donors. Justice Dambrot also suggested that “unlike the case
where the donor was a spouse or sexual partner, where any risk of infection had already
been assumed before the assisted conception procedure, in the case of other known or
anonymous donors the woman had not assumed any risk prior to the assisted conception
procedure.”29 This reasoning too defies both logic and reality. In many situations, before
incurring the expense and intervention of assisted conception, women who approach their
doctors for assistance in conceiving with known donor semen will have first attempted
home insemination30; therefore they too will have already been exposed to the risk of
28

See Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 where the Supreme Court
found that failure to provide sign language interpreters where necessary for effective communication for
the procurement of medical services is a violation of equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.
29
Doe v Canada, supra note 2 at 23.
30
In Jane Doe v Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 5430 a lesbian couple who had been unable to conceive with
their known donor through home insemination challenged the constitutionality of the Semen Regulations.
While the facts do not indicate one way or the other, it seems reasonable to suspect that Susan Doe also
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infection. What is more, women do not automatically, upon initial exposure to infected
semen, contract sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV. Arguably, any woman who
has not actually been infected by diseased semen faces the same risk from assisted
conception, regardless of whether she has previously been exposed to the semen. In other
words, the purpose of the exclusion identified by the Court is only logical for women
who have already been infected by the semen of their spouse or sexual intimate. Those
excluded women, who are in a spousal or sexual relationship with their donor, but who
have not been infected by their semen, are, in terms of risk of infection, in the same
position as women who are subject to the requirements of the Semen Regulations.
Finally, if the purpose of the restrictions against using semen donated by men over 40 or
by alcoholic men is actually to prevent birth defects, as was suggested by the Court, it
isn’t logical to exclude from this restriction women who are in a spousal or sexual
relationship with men over 40 or alcoholic men.
Undeniably, one of the legislative objectives of the Semen Regulations is to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. In keeping with this objective, it is simple,
and logical (to use Justice Drambot’s language) to subject anonymous semen to the
regiment of testing prescribed in the Semen Regulations. It would also be consistent with
the legislative objective articulated by the Court, although for the reasons stated above
perhaps not efficacious, to subject the semen of all known donors to this regiment of
testing. However, as argued above, there doesn’t appear to be a well reasoned basis,
consistent with the stated objective, to exclude from the strictures of the Semen
Regulations, some known donors, but not others. I would suggest that the exclusion from

would have attempted the more personal and private home insemination approach before seeking medical
intervention.
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the Semen Regulations of known donors who are in a spousal or sexual relationship with
the women seeking assisted conception, is actually based on hetero-normative and
outdated assumptions or understandings about family and interpersonal relationships in
contemporary Canadian society. That is to say, the exclusion from the Regulations is
premised on a monogamous, heterosexual ideal of the family which presumes that the
semen of husbands ought not to be subjected to the same testing and restrictions as that of
any other known donor semen. If this is so then, the constitutional difficulty with the
definition of “assisted conception” under the Semen Regulations isn’t only that its’ effects
impose a differential burden to some as a result of their sexual orientation but that, by
relying on a hetero-normative, traditional conception of the family its purpose imposes
differential treatment based on family status. If this is the case then, even within an
analytical framework which privileges purpose over effect, the definition of assisted
conception under the Regulations violates section 15 of the Charter.
In appealing Justice Dambrot’s decision, Susan Doe’s counsel described the issue
of the purpose of the exclusion as “the $64,000 question”, candidly, and in my opinion
mistakenly, acknowledging to the Court that “if I am wrong with respect to the purpose
of the Regulations, I have a much tougher case”.31 Indeed, Susan Doe’s appeal of the
decision to dismiss her section 15 challenge failed directly as a result of this issue. The
Ontario Court of Appeal, describing it as the pivot of the appellant’s challenge, adopted
Justice Dambrot’s conclusion as to the purpose of the exclusion, rejecting the appellant’s
argument that its purpose pertained to respecting women’s autonomy and that this
concept of voluntariness under the Regulations should apply to both heterosexual and
lesbian women using known donors. Had Susan Doe argued that the definition of
31

276 D.L.R. (4th) 127 (C.A.) at para. 27.
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assisted conception treated certain types of families differently and that the purpose of
this differential treatment was based on family status, her claim at the very least would
not have fallen prey to the formalistic bent with which Courts of late appear to be
approaching section 15 challenges.32

III.

DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF FAMILY STATUS

Status 1. social position, rank, relation to others, relative importance…33
Family …5. the basic unit in society traditionally two parents rearing their own or
adopted children; also any of various social units differing from but regarded as
equivalent to the traditional family <a single parent ~>…34

Over ten years ago, in Miron v Trudel, Justice McLachlin, as she then was, in
determining that marital status constituted an analogous ground under section 15, noted
that “[o]f late, legislators and jurists throughout our country have recognized that
distinguishing between cohabitating couples on the basis of whether they are legally
married or not fails to accord with current social values or realities (emphasis added)”.35
Justice McLachlin’s conclusions in Miron v Trudel recognized that the notion of family
in Canada had evolved and that the equality protections guaranteed under section 15 of
the Charter require that the government enact laws which do reflect current social
realities and values and do not treat individuals differently because of the types of
families to which they belong.36 In Canada v Mossop, Justice L’Heureux-Dube, writing

32

See Pothier, supra note 4.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th ed.,
34
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition
35
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 at para. 165.
36
In Nova Scotia v Walsh [2002] 4 SCR 325 the Supreme Court of Canada denied a section 15 challenge to
the definition of spouse (which distinguishes between common law and married couples) under Nova
Scotia’s Matrimonial Property Act, RSNS 1989, c.275. While the crown conceded, and the Court agreed,
that marital status is an analogous ground under section 15, the challenge was denied on the basis that the
33
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in dissent in reference to an interpretation of the Canadian Human Rights Code, adopted
an experiential definition of the family:
A review of our legislation reveals the extent to which laws have changed
to reflect the realities of families. The treatment of common law spouses
is but one example. Law and Family have long been engaged in an
Escherian dialectic, each shaping the other while at the same time being
shaped….[T]he interpretation of “family status” in the Act must account
not only for current legal and societal conceptions, but also for the lived
experience of family.37
Whether one adopts Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s broad interpretation of the legal
recognition of family, an interpretation based on concordance with current social values
or realities, or even a more narrow definition incorporating only those family structures
which have received legal recognition, the types of families, members of whom are
discriminated against by the Semen Regulations, would likely qualify. The notion of
family has further evolved in the twelve years since Miron v Trudel was decided; today’s
‘current social reality’ in terms of the family includes not just unmarried, cohabiting
common law couples and their offspring but a variety of other non-conventional or
‘queer’ family structures.

distinction does not affect the dignity of common law spouses and does not deny them access to a benefit or
advantage available to married persons. Their reasoning relied on the fact that common law couples had
the option to access the legislation through marriage, domestic contracts or registered domestic
partnerships. The element of choice central to the legislative distinction between types of families deemed
constitutionally permissible in Nova Scotia v Walsh is not at play under the Semen Regulations. For most,
if not all, women subject to the Regulations, marrying or entering into a sexual relationship with their
chosen donor would obviously be a choice which could only be made with great sacrifice to their personal
dignity, if at all.
37
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 at para. 120. While Justice L’Heureux-Dube was in dissent in Mossop, her
observations regarding the family, particularly in light of the legal recognition which gay and lesbian
couples have received since the majority wrote their decision in Mossop, are noteworthy.
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Decreasing numbers of Canadian and American families fit the
traditionally normative pattern of the nuclear family that consists of a
father and mother and their children. Increasing numbers of lesbians are
choosing to create families without heterosexual sex. The lesbian and gay
baby boom is creating a culture of its own, evolving new definitions of
family relationships.38
One non-conventional family structure which has recently received legal recognition in
Canada is the three parent or shared parenting family model. Legal recognition of this
type of family was demonstrated in a recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision, A.A. v
B.B. and C.C.39 A.A. v B.B. involved a three parent family consisting of a five year old
son (D.D.), his biological father (B.B.) and mother (C.C.) and his biological mother’s
partner (A.A.). His two mothers serve as D.D.’s primary caregivers. However, B.B.,
whose role was not limited simply to the donation of semen, has remained involved in the
child’s life. The family sought a declaration under the Children’s Law Reform Act
recognizing that A.A is also D.D.’s mother. The couple did not apply for an adoption
order because under an adoption order B.B. would lose his status as D.D.’s parent. In
other words, what this family sought was legal recognition of all three parents; the
Ontario Court of Appeal granted their family this recognition. While the decision was
not based on constitutional/equality grounds, but rather on the basis of the Court’s parens
patriae jurisdiction and the best interests of the child, it nevertheless constitutes legal
recognition of a three parent family.

38

S. Dundas & M. Kaufman, “The Toronto Lesbian Family Study” (2000) 40 (2) J. Homosexuality 65 at
66.
39
[2007] O.J. No. 2 [hereinafter A.A. v B.B.].
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The Semen Regulations deny a benefit to many individuals whose family structure
does not conform to traditional understandings of family, while providing that benefit to
those whose family status does reflect the traditional normative family model. They draw
a distinction based on the nature of the relationship between the individual seeking
insemination and the potential biological father. Those seeking to create a conventional
family which has one mother, the biological mother, and one father, the biological father
avoid the costs and burdens imposed by the Semen Regulations. While those seeking to
create a non-conventional family, whether that be, for instance, a shared parenting family,
such as the one at issue in A.A. v B.B., a single parent family headed by a celibate woman,
a family such as the one at issue in Doe v Canada in which a lesbian couple want to use
the same donor a second time so that their children will be biologically related, or any
other non-traditional family model, are subject to the costs and other burdens of the
Regulations. Regardless of the role that one’s chosen donor will play in the family,
individuals who belong to, or are seeking to build, non-traditional or queer families are
subject to the Semen Regulations while those seeking to create biologically created, two
parent, hetero-normative families are not.
In his concurring opinion in M v H, Justice Bastarache noted that “it would be
consistent with Charter values of equality and inclusion to treat all members in a family
relationship equally and all types of family relationships equally.”40 In M v H, Justice
L’Heureux-Dube, built on her experiential definition of family by adding a functional
component to the definition of family:

40

In M v H , [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 the Supreme Court of Canada found that the heterosexual definition of
spouse in section 29 of Ontario’s Family Law Act contravened section 15 of the Charter by discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court’s recognition of the need to treat all family relationships
equally is useful for the purposes of this argument.

17

The functional approach involves an examination of a cluster of variables
that may be commonly found in families. These variables include the
existence of a relationship of some standing in terms of time and with the
expectation of continuance, self-identification as a family, holding out to
the public of the unit as a family, an emotional positive involvement,
sexual union, raising and nurturing of children, care giving to children or
adults, shared housework, internal division of life-maintenance tasks, coresidence…Not all variables are present in any given family, and there is
no one variable that is present in all families.41
For purposes of providing or denying benefits, the government and courts often take a
functional approach to defining family.42 Under a functional approach, many of the
families created through the use of a chosen donor who is not in a sexual relationship
with the birth mother would receive legal recognition in terms of tax laws, child support
laws and child custody laws. If these relationships are, or should be, recognized as
family under the law, then correspondingly, they should also be protected against
discrimination on the basis of family status, under section 15 of the Charter. By
excluding from the obligations and costs of the Semen Regulations individuals whose
choice of known donor, and therefore type of family unit, is premised on a sexual union,
while excluding all others whose known donor is not sexually united to them, the
Regulations privilege members of one type of family while unnecessarily burdening
individuals whose family structure is based on other types of relationships.

41
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The under inclusive exception created by the Semen Regulations relies on
stereotypical attitudes about the presumed characteristics or situations of individuals
involved in non-traditional familial relationships which deviate from the monogamous
two parent heterosexual norm. “In the great majority of cases the existence of prejudicial
treatment based on an enumerated or analogous ground leads to a conclusion that s. 15(1)
has been infringed. Distinctions made on these grounds are typically based on
stereotypical attitudes about the presumed characteristics or situations of individuals
rather than their true situation or actual ability.”43
The distinction in the Semen Regulations should be between anonymous donors
and known donors, not between known donors whose connection to the biological mother
is sexual or spousal and known donors whose connection to the biological mother is not
sexual.

In the majority of cases, some degree of familial connection will be created

when a woman or couple (such being predominantly lesbian not heterosexual couples)
uses a known donor.44 In fact, in a significant number of cases, the known donor will
play some parental role in the family.45 Lesbian women who use known donors
frequently share a family status similar to that of the claimants in A.A. v B.B.: a three
parented family in which a lesbian couple and a male individual (in the majority of cases
a gay male individual46) with whom they have some form of relationship together, form a
familial unit.47 Family status is also implicated, regardless of the degree of further
involvement of the known donor, for those queer families who wish to have additional
43
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children ‘biologically fathered’ by the same known donor, as was the case in Doe v
Canada. The Regulations, by imposing high costs and lower rates of conception on
women whose donors are not their sexual or spousal intimate discriminate on the basis of
family status; they discriminate not just against the women seeking assisted conception of
this sort but also, depending on the circumstances of a given case, against known donors,
and/or non-biological co-parents.

III. The Subversive Potential of the Family as Status
Premising a constitutional challenge to the Semen Regulations on the basis of
family status discrimination rather than simply on the basis of sexual orientation
discrimination is both more inclusive now, and more likely to promote greater inclusivity
in the future.
In “On Law’s Categories” Professor Gotell, borrowing from Foucault, engages in
a discursive analysis of the Vriend v Alberta48 decision, in order to conclude that
“through a reliance on fixed sexual identity categories the liberal legal framing of sexual
orientation” in Vriend works to reinforce the naturalness of heterosexuality.49 Her
emphasis is on the increasingly powerful role of law in constructing sexual subjectivity
and the limits placed upon the potential for transformative social and political change
embedded in producing a rigidly demarcated category of gay/lesbian.50 However, also to
be drawn from her analysis is the assertion that by relying on a rigid
48
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heterosexual/homosexual divide, claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation
serve to heterosexualize other important human signifiers which have been identified
under section 15 as prohibited grounds of discrimination.51 She suggests that this process
of heterosexualization was instigated prior to the addition of explicit sexual orientation
protections under anti-discrimination provisions. Professor Gotell contends that the
initial exclusion of sexual orientation clauses from human rights legislation has precluded
the ability of “non-heterosexuals” to claim protection against other prohibited types of
discrimination. She notes, citing cases such as Canada v Mossop52, that “prior to the
addition of explicit sexual orientation protections” unsuccessful complaints were made on
the basis of existing categories, including sex, marital status and family status.
Borrowing from Professor Katherine Lahey’s conclusions in Are We Persons Yet? Law
and Sexuality in Canada53, she suggests that such decisions confirmed the exclusion of
“non-heterosexuals” from these categories. “Discrimination against gays and lesbians, in
other words, was not about sex, family status and so on; instead, it was discrimination on
the basis of a missing pocket, --sexual orientation.” In this way, she suggests, the
existing grounds were effectively heterosexualized and sexual identities, as constituted by
the law, further essentialized. For example in Mossop, the Court denied a human rights
complaint of discrimination on the basis of family status made by Brian Mossop after he
was denied bereavement leave by his employer. Lahey suggests that the Supreme Court,
“in concluding that this discrimination was not ‘really’ on the basis of marital status, but
51
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was ‘really’ on the basis of unprotected ‘sexual orientation”’ extended heterosexual
presumptions about family and essentialized Mr. Mossop’s identity by assuming that the
source of discrimination against him must relate to his sexual orientation.54
Despite the semen, despite the importation of sexual intimacy into the definition
of assisted conception, and despite the litigants’ decision to argue discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, Susan v Doe is not solely about sex…or sexual orientation. It
is, in large measure, about family. Yet cases like this are consistently presented to the
public, and analyzed on the sole basis of whether or not there has been discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. Professor Brenda Cossman suggests that the Court’s
treatment of gay and lesbian issues in Canada over the past twenty years has left a legacy
both of transgression and normalization.55 She suggests that “the progress of formal
equality in same-sex relationship recognition…has brought a new lesbian and gay legal
subject on stage. It is a subject constituted in and through the discourses of formal
equality – a radically different subject than the lesbian and gay subject that was
constituted in and through the conservative discourses of deviance, biology and
exclusion.” She argues that while this new legal subject does in some respects challenge
and displace the heteronormativity of legal subjectivity in the familial context, the
process of inclusion through which this occurs is at the same time a normalizing strategy
in which “gays and lesbians are reconstituted through discourses of sameness.”56
One of the predominant early critiques concerning the jurisprudence under section
15 of the Charter suggested that a more appropriate analytical framework would de-
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emphasize the enumerated and analogous grounds in favour of a more contextual, more
purposive approach to equality;57 it suggested that the Court should focus more on human
dignity and whether a person is treated with equal concern, respect and consideration and
less on the requirement of differential treatment. Indeed, until her compromise in the
Court’s unanimous decision in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration)58 this was the dissenting approach adopted by Justice L’Heureux-Dube in
each of her early section 15 decisions.59 It may be that such an approach would be more
conducive to achieving the type of social transformation, the recognition of diverse
interpersonal relationships and the greater re-distribution of social and legal benefits,
advocated by some legal theorists and critics. However, there are issues which should be
noted in response to this assertion.
The legal advances made by certain sexual minorities since Egan60 and Vriend61
should not be underestimated, nor should their future role in laying the groundwork for
further social change be underestimated. Indeed, it may be that until a certain degree of
legal recognition is achieved, legal arguments based on disruption or a queering of the
law or its subjects are likely to fail. Take for example, the right to same sex marriage.
Arguments based on recognizing diverse and alternative familial type relationships and a
queering of the family, in a legal era in which the disruption or destruction of the family
was precisely the argument put forth by opponents to same sex marriage would have been
certain to fail. Indeed, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in granting same sex marriage in
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Halpern v Canada (Attorney-General)62, went to great lengths to assure the AttorneyGeneral that same sex marriage would not lead to the destruction of the family.
Moreover, a pre-mature argument focused too heavily on the relational nature of the
exclusion of gays and lesbians from the institution of marriage would have played right
into the hands of those decision makers responsible for the formal type of equality so
parsimoniously handed out in the early same sex marriage decisions63 – ‘we aren’t
denying gays and lesbians the right to marital Bliss64 (pun intended): no one is saying
homosexuals can’t get married…they just can’t marry each other’. As Cossman notes,
arguments “driven by the discourse of sameness”, ones which represented a “less radical
shift”, in cases such as M v H, had greater resonance with the Court than did those in the
earlier days of Mossop and Egan “where at least some litigants were explicitly concerned
with resisting a politics of sameness”.65 It may be, however, that while Professor
Cossman’s observation is accurate, it is only now, with the wisdom of hindsight and
experiential learning that the Canadian public and its legal system, having not witnessed
the collapse of life as we know it in an era of gay weddings, is ready to entertain
arguments about the value of disrupting the normative family model.66 The reality is,
after all, that so long as academics and activist choose to work or theorize within a legal
framework, such considerations remain salient.
62
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Ultimately, Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s vision in her Egan dissent did not come to
fruition. While in Law the Court did compromise by incorporating her emphasis on
human dignity into the section 15 analysis, the Court also unanimously affirmed the
requirement of differential treatment on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground
of discrimination. Furthermore, the Court has steadfastly maintained this course of
analysis ever since. At least for now, the categorical approach to equality, and the
obstacles it presents for more transformative, disruptive, perhaps ‘queer’ innovation of
our social structures, is here to stay. This doesn’t mean, however, that queer activists,
academics and litigants ought to resign themselves to an unproductive (or undisruptive)
relationship with equality law under the Charter. It means they ought to set about
queering or disrupting these categories and, the family being of great institutional
significance in our society, family status is a good place to start.
While all have been addressed under the rubric of sexual orientation, there is an
important distinction between the form of social exclusion underlying the discrimination
at issue in cases such as Vriend,67 Trinity Western University v British Columbia College
of Teachers68, Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada69 and cases such as
Halpern70, M v H71, Egan72 or even more obviously Chamberlain v Surrey School
District No. 3673, Mossop74 or Doe v Canada75. The former set of cases constitute
specific claims of direct discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the latter set are
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cases are about claims to societal recognition of queer relationships and families. The
significance of this distinction lies in its illumination of what I would suggest, perhaps
optimistically but I hope not naively, is the broader, underlying purpose motivating the
latter type of case: a desire for social or institutional affirmation and recognition of a
relationship, or a family which deviates from the norm … none of which is necessarily
about, or even involves, sexual orientation. To be sure, it would be more than a little
formalistic to suggest that a prohibition against same sex marriage isn’t also about
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The truth is that it is about both. The
subversive potential, the opportunity to queer the family, to ‘de-essentialize’ sexual
identity, starts with a recognition of the ability to transpose and thus transcend, if not the
identities, then certainly the goals and motivations of various equality seeking or more
importantly equality needing groups. One reason gays and lesbians in Canada, relatively
speaking, achieved so many rights so quickly, may be because of the legal battles to
achieve recognition already fought and won by other non-traditional families in Canada.
In other words, the Canadian family was already on the path to disruption so to speak.
This helped to produce a legal and social culture less reticent to at least consider the
possibility of a family model which might include monogamous gay and lesbian
couples.76

The Court in Susan v Doe was right to suggest that the category of

individuals disadvantaged by the Sperm Regulations doesn’t just include lesbian couples,
it also includes heterosexual women who wish to start, or who belong to, families with
known donors without whom they are in a sexual relationship, such as single women or
any three or more parented family. The discrimination at issue in Susan v Doe isn’t
76

Conversation with Ronalda Murphy 07/2006 comparing the different trajectories of family law reform in
Canada and the United States (where common law relationships had not received the same degree of legal
recognition by the time the pursuit for same sex marriage began in earnest.)

26

based on sexual preference; the Semen Regulations discriminate against anyone,
regardless of their sexual orientation, who wants to start or expand a family that doesn’t
conform to the traditional, stereotypical model, of a monogamous, two biologically
parented, heterosexual family, upon which the exclusion was premised. In addition to the
possibility of success, the distinct advantage of premising a claim in this case on the basis
of family status rather than sexual orientation is that it pursues the same goal, recognition
of a different way of life, a different type of family, a different choice, without
capitulating to the essentialzing effect of a rigid heterosexual/homosexual classification
of sexual identity. While still premised on the need to establish differential treatment, a
pragmatic reality under the binding analytical framework established by the Court, this
approach is more in keeping with both the element of human dignity Justice L’HeureuxDube sought to have transcend notions of enumerated and analogous group identity and
with the desire to further social transformation through the disruption of loci of
institutional power, such as the family.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Even for that small minority of heterosexual women who do use a known donor

with whom they are not sexually intimate, the familial role of that known donor is usually
different for them than it is for lesbian women. While the Court in Doe v Canada was
correct in noting that it is not only lesbian women who seek assisted conception with the
semen of a known donor, it is almost exclusively lesbian women, not heterosexual
women, who choose to conceive with a known donor who will then play a role in their
child’s life.77 Both the fact that it is almost exclusively lesbian women, not heterosexual
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women, who choose to conceive with a known donor (most frequently a gay man) who
will then play a role in their child’s life, and the fact that the majority of lesbian couples
seeking artificial insemination choose a known donor, suggest that not only does the
definition of assisted conception under the Semen Regulations discriminate on the basis
of family status but because it is a family status much more likely to be held by lesbians
and gay men the Regulations have a disproportionately adverse effect on lesbians and gay
men. Simply put, these Regulations discriminate against individuals who belong to queer
families. Gay folks are statistically more likely to belong to queer families. For them, its
effects constitute that double whammy that is intersectionality.
There are both theoretical, as well as practical, difficulties to the suggestion that
this issue be approached from a family status perspective rather than, or in addition to,
sexual orientation. One practical critique of the approach I have suggested is that it
places too much emphasis on, or gives too much legal recognition to, biological
parentage, the blood aspect of filial connections between a parent and child. A legitimate
concern of lesbian couples who have fought hard to gain legal status for the nonbiological mother in their families is that strengthening legal protection against
discrimination based on family status would correspondingly strengthen legal claims by
biological fathers against lesbian families that do not want to include biological fathers in
their families in some capacity. It is not unreasonable, however, to imagine potential
legal arrangements which could resolve this concern.78
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One theoretical critique would be that the disruptive potential of this suggested
strategy is limited –it still constitutes a categorical approach to section 15 which involves
problems of exclusion (identified by Cossman79) and essentialization (identified by
Lahey80). This is a valid critique; however, it is not my contention that a strategy such as
the one I have suggested would avoid what seem to me to be difficulties inherent to any
rights based approach to equality. Instead, my suggestion is that, so long as we are
working within such a legal paradigm we ought to consider new approaches to the
categories within section 15; approaches that might achieve better results for claimants
such as Susan Doe while at the same time pursuing some small measure of resistance or
opposition to the normative ideals which tend to exclude some and homogenize others.
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